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The period from 1980 to 1985 marked the largest peacetime mili-
tary build-up in United States history. During this period, defense
appropriations increased approximately 50 percent in real terms.
The cost of defense was not an issue; instead, debates on national
security concentrated primarily on external factors: the size and na-
ture of the Soviet threat, the merits of a maritime strategy versus a
coalition defense strategy, and the viability of a strategy to fight pro-
longed nuclear conflicts.
For the past two years, however, growth in defense spending has
been stopped; indeed, there have been slight reductions in the real
value of defense appropriations. Over the next several years, the
Department of Defense will be doing well if it manages to keep pace
with inflation. As defense resources have tightened, greater atten-
tion has been focused on internal issues - not only the question of
how much the nation should spend on defense, but questions of
how best to organize the nation's defense effort to ensure effective
and efficient operations. In fact, in late 1986 Congress enacted the
most far-reaching organizational reform of the defense establish-
ment since the War and Navy Departments were merged to create
the Department of Defense in 1947.'
Not all questions concerning the organization, policies, and pro-
cedures of the Defense Department are resolved, however. For ex-
ample, despite the passage of a spate of measures concerning the
processes through which the Defense Department acquires new
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weapons, most observers remain dissatisfied with existing acquisi-
tion plans, methods, and organizations, and additional legislative
action can be expected in the 100th Congress. It is on this new de-
fense agenda, with its emphasis on defense resources, internal or-
ganization, and procedures, that much of the current issue of the
Yale Law and Policy Review concentrates.
Gordon Adams establishes the context for the discussion by set-
ting forth the resource constraints that the Department of Defense
faces. He points out that the 1980-85 defense build-up was not
evenly balanced between defense investment and defense consump-
tion. The investment accounts - procurement, research and devel-
opment, and military construction - received much more
substantial increases than the accounts that support consumption -
personnel and operations and maintenance. Shifting the balance
between investment and consumption would not necessarily cause
problems if defense spending continued to increase in real terms
into the 1990s, according to Adams. But because such continued
increases are unlikely, the imbalance could cause problems.
Specifically, Adams contends that the investment-driven budget
increases have created a substantial backlog of appropriated but
unexpended funds. In simple terms, this means that a significant
portion of future defense outlays already are committed to particu-
lar weapon systems, research programs, and construction projects,
thus limiting the flexibility of future budgetary choices. This is a
particular problem in Adams' view, because as the larger quantities
of more sophisticated equipment ordered in the early 1980s become
operational in the latter half of the decade, operational expenses
will rise significantly. Moreover, Adams argues that the dramatic in-
crease in research and development appropriations have created a
second potential spending "bow wave." As the new generation of
weapons nears production, it will necessitate further increases in
procurement appropriations and, ultimately, additional growth in
operating funds.
In short, Adams argues that the defense program has been pre-
mised on continued real increases in defense budgets lasting well
into the 1990s. If these increases fail to appear - as seems inevita-
ble - difficult choices will have to be made involving the possibility
of reductions in the size of the nation's armed forces, radical cuts in
future investment, and sharp reductions in operational readiness.
Congress and the Department of Defense will have to assess defense
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budget priorities in order to ensure that a more balanced program is
achieved.
James Lacy describes a second major constraint on future defense
planning: probable shortfalls in available military manpower. In
this context, he identifies two types of problems which are likely to
develop.
First, Lacy points out that the armed forces will be squeezed be-
tween growing demands for qualified recruits and a concomitant
shrinkage in the available manpower supply. Much of the incremen-
tal demand for manpower will arise as the equipment ordered in the
sharply rising budgets of the early 1980s becomes operational in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the U.S. will continue
its descent into a "demographic depression," with the size of the
recruitable population declining at least through 1995. Barring a
return to conscription, Lacy suggests that deficiencies in our ability
to man the planned larger and more technically sophisticated forces
of the 1990s will have to be addressed by various forms of substitu-
tion - civilian for military manpower, automated equipment for
manpower, and womanpower for manpower.
Second, Lacy notes that by the early 1990s, the nation's armed
forces will be more heavily dependent on mobilizable reserves than
at any time since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. He ar-
gues that this increasing reliance on reserve forces is unwise for two
reasons: i) the U.S. is unlikely to have sufficient warning in advance
of hostilities to mobilize reserve forces; and ii) the current structure
of reserve forces is a patchwork that has been determined more by
domestic politics than by assessment of military needs. Correcting
these problems, in Lacy's view, requires a rethinking of the balance
between forces-in-being and mobilizable reserves. Specifically, he
calls for the United States to reverse the gradual transfer of support
missions from the active to the reserve forces, and to undertake a
wholesale reexamination of the organization, training, and funding
of the entire reserve apparatus.
Each of the next three articles in the overview examines the sys-
tem that the United States uses to acquire weapons for the armed
forces. The three articles differ radically, however, in their assess-
ments of what is wrong with the system and, consequently, in their
prescriptions for reform.
The most critical perspective is found in the piece by Danielle
Brian-Bland and Dina Rasor. They argue that Defense Department
officials have put concerns of bureaucratic politics and institutional
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self-interest above the interests of both the taxpayer and the soldier.
In their view, officials have hidden from Congress the myriad
problems in the weapons procurement process, in order to protect
their personal and organizational positions.
To rectify the problems they describe, Brian-Bland and Rasor of-
fer a three-point reform package. First, they would strengthen the
laws that prohibit executive branch officials from making false or
misleading statements to Congress. Second, they call for shifting
more procurement-related jobs from military officers to civilians,
and for a corresponding reduction in the size of the officer corps.
Third, in order to restrict the so-called "revolving door" through
which officers retire from the armed forces to jobs in defense indus-
try, they propose a two-year waiting period before procurement of-
ficers can accept related jobs with defense contractors.
Whereas Brian-Bland and Rasor are concerned primarily with
"fraud and abuse" in the defense procurement system, Jacques
Gansler maintains that "waste" is the far more important problem.
He argues that the most significant causes of inefficiency in the pro-
curement system are structural deficiencies, not dishonest officials
or inadequate regulations. Specifically, he says that the waste of de-
fense resources results from the domination of the weapon selection
process by the individual military services, from the inadequacy of
cost-estimating procedures, from the continual lengthening of the
amount of time required to develop and procure weapon systems,
and from the deterioration of the nation's defense industrial base.
Gansler calls for four major structural reforms. First, he proposes
to improve both the allocation of defense resources and the selec-
tion of weapons by involving to a much greater degree both the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of U.S.
combat forces in initial decisions on weapons. Second, Gansler ar-
gues strongly for a biennial budget process; a shift to two-year
budgets, he maintains, would enhance the stability of weapon pro-
grams and thus reduce their real costs. Third, Gansler proposes
that the Defense Department rely more on natural market incentives
than on regulations, a move which would ensure higher quality
weapons and lower costs. And, finally, Gansler would establish a
new office in the Department of Defense with responsibility for tak-
ing action to ensure the health of U.S. defense industries. Gansler
concludes that the cumulative effect of these four reforms would be
to bring about a "cultural change" in the weapon acquisition pro-
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cess which would ultimately result in better weapons being built on
shorter schedules and at lower costs.
In contrast to both Gansler and Brian-Bland and Rasor, Robert
Daniell offers a defense of the current weapon acquisition process,
contending that most of the goods and services purchased by the
Department of Defense are delivered on time, for the contracted
price, and with the agreed-upon quality. In his view, much of the
public's mistrust of the Pentagon and of defense contractors stems
from an inadequate understanding of the unique nature of the de-
fense market: it is comprised of a single large customer who de-
mands technically advanced equipment that can survive in a wide
range of environments and be maintained by a young work force of
volunteers with only limited experience and training. Accordingly,
Daniell suggests that it is important that the public be better edu-
cated in the realities of defense procurement in order to restore
confidence in the current system. Moreover, citing the experience
in recent years in remedying problems of spare parts pricing, Dan-
iell concludes that the existing procurement system has an inherent
self-correcting dynamic that obviates the need for any major
overhaul.
The final article in this issue, by Noel Gayler, addresses nuclear
arms control. Gayler rejects the "classic negotiation approach" that
seeks to promote nuclear stability through a series of incremental
reductions. Instead, he proposes a more sweeping "general nuclear
settlement" between the U.S. and USSR. Under this proposal, both
nations would agree to a mutual moratorium on the development,
testing, and deployment of all nuclear weapons - in other words, a
nuclear freeze. They also would agree to a series of deep cuts in
their existing nuclear stockpiles until "minimum invulnerable deter-
rents" against nuclear war were reached. Although Gayler does not
specify the size of these minimum deterrents, it is clear that he in-
tends that each side be left with only a few hundred weapons.
Gayler suggests further that this general nuclear settlement would
be possible only if U.S.-Soviet tensions could be reduced substan-
tially. Toward this end, he sets forth a series of proposals, including
the cessation of threatening rhetoric by each side. He also proposes
that that United States and the Soviet Union renounce "nuclear war-
fighting doctrines." And he proposes several measures to improve
communications between the great powers and to establish mutual
confidence of peaceful intent between them.
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Some would dismiss such a comprehensive scheme for dramatic
improvements in the great powers' relations and for a general nu-
clear settlement as hopelessly utopian. Gayler, however, contends
that only such comprehensive and radical measures would truly re-
duce the risk of nuclear conflagration.
As should be clear from the range of the articles contained in this
issue of the Yale Law and Policy Review, contemporary problems of
defense planning and policy are no less diverse than they are con-
troversial. Still, it is evident that, at present, the focus of the de-
fense debate is primarily on domestic issues of defense decision-
making. What share of the nation's resources - manpower, federal
expenditures, technical expertise and materiel - should be allo-
cated to the Department of Defense? How should the Department
be organized to ensure the most effective and efficient use of these
resources? How could the processes through which the nation
plans its future defense policies and programs, and acquires the
weapons, equipment, and manpower to carry them out, be stream-
lined to reduce the burden of defense? What policies can best as-
sure our security in the nuclear age?
This issue of the Review presents an interesting sampling of opin-
ion on these and related questions and, as such, should help to clar-
ify and focus readers' consideration of these essential topics.
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